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WHEN TO BITE: Why Hasn’t Argentina Terminated Its Bilateral Investment
Treaties?
Abstract
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) commit governments to behave “politely” towards foreign investors’
property rights and grant the latter the right to sue governments when violations occur. Some studies
show that the greater the exposure to investment arbitration, the more likely states are to terminate their
BITs. Other studies show that progressive governments are more likely to terminate treaties than
economically liberal ones. In this paper, I argue that both ideology and exposure to investment arbitration
are necessary but not sufficient conditions for countries when exiting BITs. As the case of Argentina
shows, not all progressive governments prefer to exit the investment regime. As Argentina’s Former
General Attorney told me in an interview, “Argentina made the decision, in fact I made the decision, to stay
within the system. And overall, we did pretty well.” This study aims at providing an explanation to this
preference: more concretely, why has Argentina decided to uphold its BITs during 12 years of progressive
rulers? I explore three hypotheses, A) time inconsistencies, B) reputational consequences on FDI inflows,
and C) sectoral composition of FDI portfolio. I finally show that sectoral composition of FDI can help
predict when international treaties may be rescinded. My model proposes that the size of sunk costs can
lead governments to shift their preferences regarding treaty adherence. Because of industry-specific
characteristics, the sunk costs in Argentina’s foreign investments are difficult to capture. Hence,
Argentina has more to gain from future FDI than from treaty termination. The results of this study provide
critical information on BITs’ immune system by producing new data and recording key insights by elite
policy-makers. This is particularly valuable considering that the secrecy in the process of investment
arbitration is often described as “having gone too far.”
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WHEN TO BITE: WHY HASN’T ARGENTINA
TERMINATED ITS BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES?

1

Introduction
“It's the million-dollar question: Why didn't Argentina terminate the BITs?
What happened in those 12 years? Not a single treaty was terminated.
Why didn’t we modify them?”1

No country in the world has faced more lawsuits from foreign companies than Argentina.
From 1997 to 2022, the country accumulated a total of 62 cases before international arbitration
courts. While there are several explanations for the diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs)2, there is no scholarly consensus as to what determines BIT termination. Ideology of the
ruling party can partially explain noncompliance. As Julia Calvert has shown, governments that
agree with the ideological premises of BITs show higher rates of compliance. At the same time,
leftist governments tend to violate BITs because of limitations to regulatory space, costly
arbitration awards, and normative assumptions, all of which BITs rely on. Such governments
eventually seek to reduce their exposure to arbitral claims, by either terminating BITs altogether,

1
Extract from an interview with investment arbitration lawyers from Argentina’s Defense Team, 8-10
February 2022.

See, for example, Beth A. Simmons, “Bargaining over Bits, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for
Protection and Promotion of International Investment,” World Politics 66, no. 1 (2013): 12–46,
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887113000312; Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett,
“Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,” International Organization 60, no. 04 (2006): 781–810,
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060267; Jennifer L. Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “When Bits Have Some
Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties,” The Review of International
Organizations 6, no. 1 (July 2010): pp. 1–32, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-010-9089-y; Todd Allee and Clint
Peinhardt, “Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” World Politics 66, no. 1
(2013): 47–87, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887113000324; Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A.
Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000,” International
Organization 60, no. 04 (2006): 811–846, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060279: Andrew T. Guzman, “Why
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” Virginia Journal
of International Law (February 1998), 73–97, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0003.
2
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resigning from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, or modifying key
provisions.3 In this paper, however, I show that ideology is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for countries when exiting BITs. In particular, Argentina shows high levels of noncompliance and
yet maintains its investment treaties. This study aims at providing an explanation as to why
Argentina decided to uphold its BITs during 12 years of progressive rulers. This question is
important because the underlying assumption, drawn from the extant literature, is that countries
are more likely to attempt BIT termination after repeated exposure to investment arbitration. To
approach this question, I rely on the theoretical framework of the Obsolescing Bargain Model
(OBM). I explore three hypotheses that could explain Argentina’s adherence to bilateral
investment treaties: A) time inconsistencies, B) reputational consequences on FDI inflows, and C)
sectoral composition of FDI portfolio.
This paper concludes that the most important factor affecting Argentina’s decision to
uphold its treaties is diversification in foreign direct investment (FDI). Sectoral composition of
FDI not only predicts where expropriation may occur, but also when international treaties may be
rescinded. I examine two important reasons for such phenomenon: varying sunk costs across
sectors and differences between FDI target sector and ISDS target sector.
According to the OBM, after initial investment occurs, “capital is sunk,” meaning that it
cannot be recovered or transferred.98 Scholars identify technological differences that affect the
magnitude of sunk costs across sectors, thus making absorption of sunk costs (e.g., by

3
See Alexander Thompson, Tomer Broude, and Yoram Haftel, “Once Bitten, Twice Shy? Investment
Disputes, State Sovereignty and Change in Treaty Design,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3367800; F. M. Lavopa, L. E. Barreiros, and M. V. Bruno, “How to Kill a Bit and Not
Die Trying: Legal and Political Challenges of Denouncing or Renegotiating Bilateral Investment Treaties,” Journal
of International Economic Law 16, no. 4 (January 2013): 869–891, https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgt025.
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expropriation) more or less desirable than BIT adherence. My work contributes to this body of
literature––that mostly studies expropriation––by extending the scope of the theory. I propose that
the size of sunk costs not only determines a government’s likelihood to nationalize a particular
sector, but also causes it to shift its preferences regarding treaty adherence and exposure to
international arbitration.
Because of industry-specific characteristics, the sunk costs in Argentina’s foreign
investments are more difficult to capture. The majority of Argentina’s ISDS claims target public
services, a sector which only encompasses 7% of its annual FDI. Why would Argentina want to
abandon a regime that only constrains (litigates) 7% of its FDI? It would simply be too costly to
dismantle the foreign investment regime in order to protect such a small part of its economy. Here,
reputational consequences and sunset clauses weigh heavily, making treaty exit undesirable.
Hence, Argentina has more to gain from future FDI than from treaty termination. Additionally, the
country can enjoy the benefits of BITs protections seeing that it is a moderate capital exporter.

While this research focuses on Argentina, it often relies on a peripheral case, Ecuador, to
test the general validity of findings. The empirical part relies on quantitative data on ISDS
outcomes, sectoral patterns of expropriation, and FDI trajectory, as well as on qualitative insights
based on interviews with office holders who led Argentina’s strategy before arbitral courts. This
project offers not only empirical support for a sector-based explanation, but also an opportunity to
shed light on an overly opaque issue of international relations. The lack of transparency in the
process of investment arbitration hampers scholarly inquiry and policy recommendations. The use
of a case study approach thus seems particularly valuable for its capacity to produce multifaceted and detailed qualitative information.

6

This study is important considering the critical context of investment arbitration law, which
is mostly nonexistent outside of BITs. Many intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations began studying the limitations of the current regime. The EU went as far as to
propose the establishment of a multilateral permanent investment court, hoping this would solve
the ad hoc nature of the ISDS, among other problems.4 The results of this study provide critical
information on bilateral treaties’ immune system. It produces new data and records key insights
by elite office holders who participated in investment arbitration. This is particularly valuable
considering that the secrecy in the process of investment arbitration is often described as “having
gone too far.”5

2

Research Design: Aims, Methods, and Limitations
This research project employs a case study approach, and thus examines the details behind

Argentina’s strategy with Bilateral Investment Treaties. It also at times relies on an ancillary case,
Ecuador, in order to test the theory generated from the core case. Ecuador will thus be briefly
discussed, gaining prominence only in the last section––Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock. While
Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa left the ICSID, spoke avidly against the foreign investment
regime, and terminated its treaties, Argentina’s rulers kept all its treaties in force, and did not
attempt to modify key provisions––an alternative countries take to reduce exposure to international

Fahira Brodlija and Lidija Šimunović, “The Path of (r)Evolution of the International Investor State Dispute
Settlement Regime,” EU 2020 – Lessons from the Past and Solutions for the Future, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.25234/eclic/11929.
5
Kimberly A Elliott et al, “Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Volume 1: Market Access and Sectoral Issues,”
PIIE (Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 20, 2021), https://www.piie.com/publications/piiebriefings/assessing-trans-pacific-partnership-volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral, 117; “Transparency and Third
Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures,” OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, January 2005, https://doi.org/10.1787/524613550768.
4
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arbitration. I thus explore the factors that led these countries to take up discordant investment
policies.
In terms of case selection, Argentina and Ecuador are both Global South countries that top
the list of investment disputes’ respondents. They were purposely matched so as to control the
variable of ideology, on which I propose the literature relies too heavily for predictions of treaty
adherence. In the process of hypothesis building, I draw on insights from the literature as well as
on interviews that I conducted with former public officials—among them, Argentina’s General
Attorney 2004–2010, Osvaldo Guglielmino, Argentina’s Minister of Treasure 2017–2019, Nicolas
Dujovne, and investment arbitration lawyers from the General Attorney’s Office of International
Affairs whose identity is kept confidential. It is not my purpose to make a value judgement on
Argentina’s experience with the investment regime. Research in this field has not provided
measures or frameworks to do so. The grounds for my research question are not based on my
valuation of Argentina’s performance in arbitral courts, but on research studies that correlate
greater exposure to ISDS with attempts to abandon the BIT regime.
The thesis first offers a background examination of the foreign investment regime,
including outlines of BITs and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, along with other important
factors. It then outlines the history of Argentina’s specific involvement with BITs and ISDS,
leading to an explanation of when the lawsuits began to be brought against the country and the
reasons for them. This is done in order to provide the context of the thesis, and to build a framework
from which the argument proceeds.
For section 4, I consulted scholarly research, and primary and secondary sources, including
news articles and congressional speeches and bills. In sections 6 and 7, I employ statistical data
from prior research to support or challenge the three hypotheses proposed. The most important

8

section of this paper, Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock, examines Argentina and Ecuador’s
foreign direct investment by sector. I collected the statistical evidence relevant to this section by
summarizing FDI datasets available at the Central Bank of Ecuador and the Central Bank of
Argentina. The results suggest sectoral diversification may be an overlooked aspect of BITs’
immune system.
I will use the term ‘progressive’ to refer to governments that implement policies of wealth
distribution as well as protectionist economic policy and the term ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ to
describe governments with a preference for free-market economics. One of the most important
concepts in this study is the idea of BIT termination. A bilateral investment treaty is terminated
when one of the parties unilaterally denounces it. I will be using the expression BIT exit, BIT
denunciation, or BIT termination interchangeably. When I claim a government leaves the
investment regime, I also am referring to a broad policy of BIT termination. In terms of
generalizability, I expect my findings to be applicable to other progressive governments of the
Global South who participate in the investment regime. Because this project’s research utilizes a
case study, however, the outcomes are subject to sampling error. Though I attempted to address
this through the addition of a foil case, Hypothesis C (Diversified FDI) should be further tested in
other countries to increase external validity.

3

Background: The Foreign Investment Regime
i.

Bilateral Investment Treaties

Because there is no centralized investment organization, countries wanting to formalize
rules regarding FDI must do so bilaterally and voluntarily. Bilateral Investment Treaties are thus
the main source of international investment law. Though less frequently, countries may also sign

9

multilateral investment treaties (MITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) that include chapters on
investment.6 In broad terms, BITs state that the treaty parties (both the host state and the home
state of investors) will commit to behaving “politely” towards foreign firms’ property rights. More
explicitly, host states guarantee fair and timely compensation for contractual breaches, direct and
indirect expropriation, discriminatory treatment (regarding local firms), and restrictions on capital
mobility, among other things. The body of the treaty substantially defines key terms, such as
investment and “fair and equitable treatment,” the language and precision of which has evolved
over time.7 Theorists argue that the design of investment treaties responds to problems of cynical
ratification by raising the ex-post costs of noncompliance. 8 The latter is attributed to chapters of
dispute settlement, which allows delegation to a third-party institution and monetary compensation
to investors when violations are found.

ii.

Investor-State Dispute Settlements

Mechanisms of dispute settlement between parties of an international treaty vary depending
on the issue area. In the case of investment, the most popular method is ISDS. In ISDS, investors
have the right to call for international arbitration when they suspect a BIT has been violated. At
this moment, each of the parties, the investor, and the host state, has the right to appoint a member
of the tribunal. If the parties cannot come to an agreement over procedures, the appointed authority

Mary Hallward-Driemeier, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit … and They Could
Bite *,” The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, February 2009: 349–378,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0013.
7
Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital.”
6

This is the theory of credible commitments. Allison Marston Danner and Beth A. Simmons, “Credible
Commitments and the International Criminal Court,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991128.
8
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does so on their behalf.9 More than half of investor-state disputes are filed in the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Other popular courts that hold ISDS
include the Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).10 ISDS is particularly controversial because it places sovereign governments
vis-à-vis corporate actors. Scholars and activists have recently claimed that ISDS promotes a race
to the bottom and a shrinking of state regulatory space.11

iii.

Duration: Sunset Clauses

BITs also have a sunset provision, alternatively known as a survival or grandfathering
clause, which specifies the duration of the treaty. Though there is variation, most sunset clauses
state that if any of the parties decides to terminate the treaty, the BIT will remain in force for a
number of years after the date of termination (usually from 5 to 20 years depending on the BIT).
Sunset clauses are an important aspect of BITs’ “immune system,”12 as they are meant to protect
the treaties from opportunistic behavior by state office holders. As explained by Lavopa, Barreiros,
and Bruno, they exist to “guarantee prospective investors a certain level of predictability of the
rules” over time.13

9

Brodlija and Šimunović, “The Path of (r)Evolution of the International Investor State Dispute Settlement

Regime.”
10

Weghmann and Hall. “The Path of (r)Evolution of the International Investor State Dispute Settlement

Regime.”
R. Polanco, J. de Sépibus, and K. Holzer, “TTIP and Climate Change:” Carbon & Climate Law Review 11, no. 3
(2017): pp. 206-222, https://doi.org/10.21552/cclr/2017/3/14; Yoram Z. Haftel and Hila Levi, “Argentina’s Curious
Response to the Global Investment Regime: External Constraints, Identity, or Both?,” Journal of International
Relations and Development 23, no. 4 (April 2019): pp. 755-780, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-019-00174-8.
12
Lavopa, Barreiros, and Bruno, “How to Kill a Bit and Not Die Trying.”
13
Lavopa, Barreiros, and Bruno, “How to Kill a Bit and Not Die Trying,” 878.
11
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iv.

Overlap with Domestic Norms
BITs should be understood alongside domestic obligations that exist in host countries’ legal

framework. Generally, there are three layers of law that protect multinational corporations:
domestic property rights (which apply to all individuals and associations), private law (which
applies to both domestic and foreign firms that have concession contracts with government
agencies), and international law (which applies to foreign companies protected by BITs).
In the process of privatization, the government signs concession contracts, or PublicPrivate Partnerships, with domestic as well as foreign firms. These contracts establish the rights
and responsibilities of both the state and the firm; they include terms for direct investment in
infrastructure, the quality of provision of services, and the cost-recovery over the decades to come.
Most of the time, firms expect to recover their initial investment through the collection of userfees, or tariffs.14 Contracts also address instances of contract violations and re-negotiations when
needed. Foreign firms that are protected by BITs thus have an extra layer of rights that domestic
firms do not.
Furthermore, when a country violates a BIT, it might also be violating other types of formal
(and informal) rules that prevail in the domestic scene. One of the investment arbitral lawyers
interviewed for this project illustrated how BITs interact with private contracts: investors file
claims by “invoking a contractual relationship, and through that contractual relationship, they say
that a BIT was violated […] For example, breach of article 12 in Contract Electricite di France

14

Alison E. Post, Foreign and Domestic Investment in Argentina: The Politics of Privatized
Infrastructure (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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with the national government is equivalent to a violation of fair and equitable treatment in BIT
Argentina-France.”15

Figure A
Foreign Investors’ Layers of Legal Protection
in Host Country

[Source: Author’s elaboration].

As illustrated in the figure above, BITs provide an additional layer of protection around
investments by granting foreign firms a more extensive set of rights than domestic ones. From
this model it follows that the violation of any internal layer implies the violation of the more
superficial ones, while the contrary is not the case. Concretely, a violation of property rights
implies a BIT violation, while a BIT violation can occur without detriment to property rights.

Extract from an interview with investment arbitration lawyers from Argentina’s Defense Team, 8-10
February 2022.
15

13

Argentina’s Experience with BITs and ISDS16

4
i.

The Debt Swap
Argentina has been a bad borrower for at least 100 years.17 Conservative politicians

believed that shrinking the public spending would make the country less reliant on international
creditors. In the ‘90s, President Carlos Menem thought he could address the debt and
hyperinflation problems through an economically liberal model. He too believed that the state
could not afford all its public infrastructure, such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in essential
sectors like energy, transportation, telecommunications, water, and sanitation. Menem18 started by
privatizing the SOEs and liberalizing trade. Like many other Latin American presidents, he
implemented the so-called “debt swap”: as public debt becomes inaccessible over time, FDI would
take its place in financing essential sectors. One of the most controversial reforms was the
instauration of a fixed exchange rate through the 1991 Convertibility Plan (1 US dollar = 1
Argentine peso). The expectation was that this regime would “effectively tie the hands of
policymakers in fiscal and monetary matters,” allowing Argentina to better compete for foreign
direct investment. 19 It was in this ideological and economic context that Argentina signed its first
bilateral investment treaty.

16

Please see Table C in Appendix for more detail on Argentinian administrations and their ideological
tendencies from 1990 to the present.
Jeffrey Sachs, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Juan Carlos de Pablo. “Debt and Macroeconomic Instability in
Argentina,” in Developing Country Debt and the World Economy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990),
37–56.
17

18 Please see Table C in Appendix for more details on Argentinian administrations and their ideological
tendencies from 1990 to the present.
19
Michael Mortimore and Leonardo Stanley, “Has Investor Protection Been Rendered Obsolete by the
Argentine Crisis?,” CEPAL Review 2006, no. 88 (December 2006): 15–31, https://doi.org/10.18356/3870c53b-en,
19.

14

Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons suggest that Argentina belongs to a group of countries that
fell prey to the trap of treacherous BITs in the context of regional competition for FDI. Their
empirical evidence shows that “the more unfavorable the conditions, the more significant the
concessions governments are willing to make in order to conclude a treaty.” 20 Their research
particularly helps explain why Argentina’s BITs later backfired. Free market policymakers were
willing to curtail state regulatory space due to their impatience to capture large shares of FDI
coming to the region. The most conflictual aspect of Menem’s BITs was arguably the indexation
of user-fee systems for firms providing consumer services. Namely, they allowed companies to set
user fees in US dollars and update them according to US prices.21 Some scholars proposed that the
profit of these investors was guaranteed as long as the convertibility regime were to stay in place.
This, however, was ultimately unsustainable. The 1899 issue of Banker’s Magazine vaticinated
the crisis with their famous statement: “no people in the world take a keener interest in currency
experiments than the Argentines.”
For a few years, the liberal economic model did show macroeconomic improvements, such
as a reduction in hyperinflation and a rise in real wages.22 However, the Convertibility Plan enabled
an unprecedented inflow of foreign capital into the country and, subsequently, a deficit in the
balance of payments. As a result, the national industry started to collapse, unemployment topped
20%, and several administrations tried to refinance sovereign debt through the “Megacanje”
program. This postponed the abandonment of the Convertibility Plan (and the crisis) for a few
years. Not long thereafter, the Tequila crisis in 1994 and the East Asian crisis in 1997 prompted

20

Simmons, “Bargaining over Bits, Arbitrating Awards,” 24.

21

Mortimore and Stanley, “Has Investor Protection Been Rendered Obsolete by the Argentine Crisis?”, 22.

22

Mortimore and Stanley, “Has Investor Protection Been Rendered Obsolete by the Argentine Crisis?”, 19.
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the 1998 Argentinian default. 23 Eventually, riots, looting, and protests rose across the nation,
demanding the president’s resignation. 24 In this time of tension, on November 29, 2001 investors
started withdrawing their assets, causing a banking panic. As a result, the executive power
suppressed constitutional rights and introduced the Corralito (enclosure in English), a thick capital
control policy to reduce civil unrest and halt the bank run. Because BITs of the 1990s provided
guarantees for free capital mobility, many claimants in ISDS later argued that this kind of capital
control qualified as expropriation.25

ii.

Abandonment of the Convertibility Plan and Devaluation

After 11 years of a catastrophic experience with the currency peg to the U.S. dollar, the
National Congress finally established the Public Emergency and Exchange Rate Reform, Bill No.
25.561. Under this bill, Argentina went back to the floating exchange rate and the market
immediately devaluated the Argentine peso. This bill also declared that concession contracts with
indexation of user-fee system were to be pesified. Namely, investors’ income was devaluated along
with the peso (e.g., if the peso in 2002 was worth 1/4 of the US dollar, so was investors’ income).26
This gave birth to an overwhelming wave of claims to ISDS.

(With external debt surpassing 50% of the GDP). Mortimore and Stanley, “Has Investor Protection Been
Rendered Obsolete by the Argentine Crisis?”
23

24

Among many other events, Argentina had 5 different presidents in just 11 days.

25

Mortimore and Stanley, “Has Investor Protection Been Rendered Obsolete by the Argentine Crisis?”

26

Ley Nº 25561 (El Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina), accessed March 30, 2022,
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As investors’ claims grew against the country, Duhalde’s government 27 created the Unity of
Friendly Negotiations and the Federal Council for Friendly Negotiations. Bill No. 25.561 stated
that the process of renegotiation should consider the interests of the users, the accessibility of
services, and the firms’ financial losses. Moreover, the Ministry of Economy’s Resolution No.
20/2002 established four phases for renegotiation. These included informal meetings with the
partners, presentations by the companies in which they offered “properly quantified proposals for
compensation” in view of the losses during the crisis, instances of negotiation of the terms, and
finally, signature of new contracts. This process did not prove satisfactory for companies, many of
which continued to uphold their cases through ISDS. Scholars claim that building an agreement
with foreign companies at this time was impossible since their “profitability depended entirely on
the Convertibility Plan.” 28 This is because the contracts signed during the privatization craze
allowed investors to a) price gas bills of Argentinian users in US dollars and b) increase them
according to the US price index. As Mortimore and Stanley point out, the state’s incapacity to
comply with these guarantees was evident all along, and exploited in the crisis.29

iii.

The Kirchner Era: Renationalization of Public Services

Bitterness with economic liberalism created the conditions for the electoral victory of left
leaders, not only in Argentina but across Latin America.30 The election of protectionist Néstor

27

Please see Table C in Appendix for more details on Argentinian administrations and their ideological
tendencies from 1990 to the present.
28
Michael Mortimore and Leonardo Stanley, “La Argentina y Los Tratados Bilaterales De Inversion: El
Costo De Los Compromisos Internacionales,” Desarrollo Económico 46, no. 182 (2006): 189,
https://doi.org/10.2307/4151111.
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Latina, January 2018, 155–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvn96f4f.9.
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Kirchner was, indeed, a “political renewal.” 31 He implemented welfarist and developmentalist
policies to alleviate the impact of the crisis on the lower classes and boost the national GDP. Most
importantly, Kirchner began the process of renationalization of public services by renegotiating or
rescinding private concession contracts.32 Companies who were nationalized filed ISDS claims
based on this renegotiation of private concession contracts. Kirchner initially planned on raising
gas and electricity bills so as to comply with investors, but he faced court injunctions and protests
that opposed the investor-friendly measure.33 Congressmen maintained that they wanted to help
Argentinians afford their gas bills, but this could not hold in international arbitration courts.
According to some, “that’s when the lawsuits started to roll in.” 34 Investors believed that private
contract breaches accounted for direct and indirect expropriation, discrimination, among others.

Argentina: Main ISDS Claims 1990–2006.

Table A
Argentina: Main ISDS Claims 1990–2006.

Object of the claim (a)
Contractual Issues(b)

No. of submissions
4

Firms
Waters of the Aconquija;
Azurix;
Siemens;
TSA
Spectrum of Argentina

31
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Treaties,” Review of International Political Economy 25, no. 1 (July 2017): 75–97, 83.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1406391.

Alison E. Post and María Victoria Murillo, “How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes:
Privatized Infrastructure after Crises,” World Development 77 (2016): 328–345,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.006.
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Provincial taxes (b)

1

Suspension of the tariff (user 2
fees) indexation scheme (b)
Economic emergency.
17
Pesification and freezing of
user fees (regulated services).
Prices (unregulated services)

Impact of the emergency on 7
private contracts

Export taxes
6
Economic emergency (price
freeze)

Total

Enron
Corporation
Ponderosa Assets
CMS; LG&E

&

Sempra; Camuzzi 1; AES;
Camuzzi 2; SDG Natural Gas;
Provintial Waters of Santa Fe;
Cordoba Waters; Argentine
Waters; Telefonica Enersis;
EDF1, EDF2; Azurix 2; Total;
Suar; General Electricity
Company; France Telecom;
Continental Casualty Co; CIT
Group Inc; Unysis; RGA
Reinsurance Co; Metalpar;
DaimlerChrysier Argentina;
Asset Recovery Trust
Pioneer Natural Resources;
Pan American Energy; El
Paso Energy International Co;
BP American; Wintershall
Mobil

37

Notes: (a) Most of the demands recognize more than one object. Thus, the classification is only intended to
reflect the most representative ones. (b) Presentations made by investors before the collapse of the convertibility
regime –though certain firms extended their claims after the peg have been abandoned. Source: Mortimore and
Stanley, “La Argentina y Los Tratados Bilaterales De Inversion.” (p 28.)

The first to demand compensation under ISDS were two private water firms: Vivendi
(French) and Azurix (American). The latter demanded the provincial authorities to raise user bills
so as to fund “service expansion and upgrades.” 35 However, the provincial authorities refused to
increase user fees, and even went as far as to penalize them for inadequate service quality. As a
consequence, investors felt pressured to curtail production costs and labor force, galvanizing mass
discontent. Many civil organizations presented evidence to show that companies had provided

Leopoldo Rodríguez-Boetsch, “Public Service Privatisation and Crisis in Argentina,” Development in
Practice 15, no. 3-4 (2005): pp. 302-315, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520500076092, 306.
35
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contaminated water and organized to “boycott bill payments.”36 After Vivendi and Azurix went to
ISDS, the government canceled remaining concession contracts with foreign energy firms, which
prompted two additional cases. One of these cases was discontinued after reports showed the
foreign firm confessed to having bribed office holders to get its original contract. 37 Though the
first few cases were settled, Argentina had to pay Vivendi and Azurix compensation awards of US
$105 million and US $165 million respectively.38

iv.

The Trenches: ISDS

As much of the literature emphasizes, Argentinian officials had no experience with
international arbitration and BITs. 39 All the individuals I interviewed for this study stressed the
fact that Argentina’s ISDS defense team was made up of nationals. Unlike other countries that hire
private law firms to manage ISDS cases, Argentina trained national lawyers from scratch to do the
job. When 30-year-old Osvaldo Guglielmino assumed the role of General Attorney in 2002, he
was met with 32 ISDS lawsuits, collectively demanding $80 billion dollars in damages. This was
approximately ten times Argentina’s sovereign reserves at the time. Guglielmino reported having
“begged” president Néstor Kirchner “to hire an American law firm” 40 to tackle ISDS. However,

Ignacio Torterola, Diego Gosis et al., “Comparative Perspectives on Laws, Treaties and Disputes for
Invest- Ors, States and Counsel,” in Latin American Investment Protections: Comparative Perspectives on Laws,
Treaties, and Disputes for Investors, States and Counsel (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2012), 5–51, 18.
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the Argentinian government was in the midst of a financial crisis, and it simply could not afford
to hire arbitration experts. Thus, in 2002, Guglielmino put together a team of Argentine lawyers,
now known as the Office of International Affairs of the General Attorney. By 2009, Guglielmino’s
unit was ranked as one of “the best boutique law firms in the world on investment arbitration.” 41
Scholars claim that investors filling claims for Argentina’s 2000s crisis had little chance of
winning whilst the country was enduring an emergency and policies were not discriminatory, given
that national firms were equally affected. Most investors filed claims nonetheless, in an attempt to
“enhance their bargaining position during contract renegotiations.” 42 Guglielmino’s defense team
appealed to the state of necessity, whereby states are excused from compensating investors when
the policies at stake happen in the context of a major crisis. However, most tribunals did not find
this argument compelling and ruled against the host state. Interestingly enough, all the rulings held
different legal grounds for rejecting Argentina’s appeal of the necessity clause. As explained by a
journalist from The Times,
One [tribunal] decided that Argentina could have been excused from its treaty obligations during a crisis,
but that a financial crisis, however severe, couldn’t count as a crisis. Another determined that a financial
crisis could indeed count as a crisis, but that Argentina’s wasn’t severe enough to qualify. A third
tribunal agreed that a financial crisis could count as a crisis, and added that Argentina’s was indeed
severe enough to count as such, but that the Argentine government had been partially responsible for
creating the crisis in the first place.43

As shown in Table A, most claims were triggered by state policies that can be traced back to the
financial crisis. First the Corralito, second, the pesification (or abandonment of the Convertibility
Plan), and, finally, the re-nationalization during Kirchnerism.
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Due to this unprecedented exposure to international arbitration, a few congressmen grew
weary of BIT terms and foreign firms in general, and asked for treaty termination in congress
sessions.44 Many other Global South governments (including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, South
Africa, and Indonesia), all facing multi-million-dollar debts to investors, grew angry at ISDS and
abandoned ICSID or denounced the treaties themselves. 45 Australia started implementing statestate dispute settlements (see for example, the Australia–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
or Australia–United States FTA).46
Despite politicians’ complaints over BIT terms, center-left president Néstor Kirchner did
not change Argentina’s bilateral treaties. Instead, his administration maintained the policy of
negotiation. In 2003, Kirchner replaced the Concession Contracts Renegotiation Committee with
the Public Service Contract and Renegotiation Unit. Nonetheless, during 12 years of a welfarist
and highly protectionist economic model, Argentinians have stayed loyal to the foreign investment
regime. Now the question becomes: given its history and extensive exposure to international
arbitration, why has Argentina not exited, or at least modified, any of its first-generation BITs?
In the section that follows, I lay out the theoretical framework that will help disentangle

Argentina’s intricate position regarding foreign investment and international litigation.
Subsequently, I ask, why should Argentina leave the BIT regime? And why should it not?

Javier Blanco, “Bielsa Pide Un Debate Nacional Sobre Los Tratados De Inversión” (LA NACION, June
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This approach allows me to weigh the benefits that the investment regime has brought, and
continues to bring, to Argentinians against the costs of maintaining it. The theoretical
framework presented here, the Obsolescing Bargain Model, foregrounds the permanent
contest between the host state’s contradictory desires to increase foreign investment on the one
hand and absorb it on the other.

5

Theoretical Framework: The Obsolescing Bargain Model
Host governments tend to have contradictory preferences regarding public-private

partnerships. On the one hand, they want to delegate responsibility for service delivery, so as to
avert reputational problems related to bad quality service provision or “controversial pricing.” 47
They also have less resources to make these enterprises as competitive as compared to private
operators. On the other hand, constituencies tend to assume that executive authorities have the
ability, and thus the responsibility, to protect consumers from contentious measures by private
contractors. This gives heads of states short-term incentives to disrupt contractors’ measures in
order to gain short-term popularity “points,” especially during electoral times. 48
This is consistent with the Obsolescing Bargain Model (OBM), built by Raymond Vernon
in 1971 to explain the relationship between foreign firms and host countries “as a function of goals,
resources and constraints on both parties.” 49 This theory predicts that when foreign corporations
negotiate with host governments over investment in public infrastructure, they initially enjoy a
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favorable bargaining position. However, over time “the bargaining power tips towards the state,”
and the company’s assets become hostages. 50
I also rely on the assumptions of the Competition Model literature, which proposes that
BITs diffused more rapidly among struggling economies at times where international credit was
becoming increasingly inaccessible. 51 These scholars find a positive relationship between overly
generous BIT provisions and unfavorable economic circumstances. In Argentina, the liberal
governments of the 1990s felt the pressure to compete with regional economies that were attracting
FDI through the ratification of bilateral treaties. Because they wanted to offer investors a more
profitable scenario than competitors such as Chile or Brazil, they gave extraordinary legal
guarantees in their BITs. In the language of OBM, financial hardships and want for capital reduces
countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis investors. Once investors transfer their assets to national
soil, bargaining power shifts towards the state. Ensuing governments thus had the confidence to
implement less “hospitable” measures that counted as treaty breaches. These ranged from
demanding companies to lower their consumer fees (preventing companies from recovering initial
costs of investment) to direct or indirect expropriation. There are three hypotheses that I examine
regarding the factors that affect the decision of whether to terminate or maintain bilateral treaties:
A) time inconsistencies, B) reputational consequences on FDI inflows, and C) sectoral
composition of FDI portfolio. The way data is arranged in Section 6 and 7 respond to this general
theoretical ground whereby countries weigh the benefits of potential investments against the
benefits of the appropriation of capital itself.
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6

Why Should Argentina Leave?
In a study similar to mine, whose arguments and evidence I engage with throughout this

paper, Scholar Julia Calvert asks the question “why has Argentina (failed) to terminate bilateral
investment treaties?” What inspires this query is the expectation that governments heavily targeted
by ISDS claims are more willing to terminate their treaties. Before getting into this debate,
however, I ought to examine what makes bilateral investment treaties desirable in the first place. I
will therefore show in what context countries signed BITs and what are the advantages that they
bring.

i.

Argentina Needs Bilateral Investment Treaties

Argentina has always struggled with finances, and it is no surprise that it has been ranked
by the IMF as the world’s largest borrower. As seen in Section 4, Argentina believed that
delegation to the private sector could curtail public spending and thus alleviate the country’s
“borrowing needs.”52 We know from the literature that this is a pattern among emerging markets
of the Global South. 53 FDI provided them with the capital they needed to grow at a time when
international credit was inaccessible. Studies show a strong correlation between stagnating bank
lending during the 1980s and the global rise in FDI. Some countries, however, had difficulties
capturing FDI shares due to long-standing economic volatility and unpredictable political
environments. In the case of Argentina, free market administrations wanted to reduce public
spending by privatizing state-owned enterprises. The problem was that, as Alison Post notes,
investors were particularly wary about “contracts with the state” as it was difficult to prevent

Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital;” Mortimore and Stanley, “Has Investor
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government officials from modifying their terms. In essence, concession contracts would always
be the first to experience the effect of the obsolescing bargain (as compared to purely private
enterprises). As explained earlier, BITs from Menem’s generation tried to compensate for the
unpopularity of public-private partnerships through the indexation of tariffs. Overly generous BITs
thus helped Argentina to lure foreign capital to desired sectors of the economy.

Figure B
Argentina’s FDI Inflows (in US$) and BITs Signature Over Time

[Source: Author’s calculations made on the basis of data from the World Bank and UNCTAD (2022)].
[Note: a) FDI inflows between 1980 and 1990 display a value of 0 because the amounts at this time are relatively
low (raging between 0.001 to 0.008 trillion of US$), and b) BITS are not cumulative in this line chart].
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As seen in Figure B above, there is a strong correlation between BIT signature and FDI
inflows. I cannot say that the drop of treaty signature beginning in 2003 captures resentment about
the treaties since, at this period, there were simply no more relevant BITs to sign. Having entered
into agreement with top capital exporters such as the US, the UK, Russia, China, and France,
Argentina had its BIT regime essentially built. It is also hard to confidently call for a causal
relationship between BITs and FDI, since relevant variables cannot be controlled. There are other
measures that could account for Argentina’s FDI boost in the 1990s, since Menem’s government
liberalized the economy as much as he could, going from monetary to fiscal policy to trade. In
fact, this is something several interviewees mentioned. We cannot know for sure whether FDI
came as a result of BITs or other, more comprehensive state policies.
This study, nonetheless, considers that general liberalization policies have shorter time
horizons than BITs. And investors are cognizant that political overturn can affect profit. In
Argentina’s case, they knew Menem’s liberal administration could not last indefinitely. With
longer time horizons, investors are not so easily reassured by investor-friendly office holders.
BITs, on the other hand, do provide guarantees that are compatible with long-term goals: sunset
clauses are impermeable to opportunistic political behavior as they protect foreign assets for 10 to
15 years after termination should this occur. Moreover, the riskier the host state is perceived to be
abroad, “the more necessary it becomes” to utilize “explicit instruments.” 54 In particular, BITs
raise the ex-post costs of noncompliance by guaranteeing monetary compensation and delegating
authority to third parties like the UNCITRAL or the ICSID.55
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During their prime, BITs arguably contributed to Argentina’s productivity, external
credibility, and foreign debt issues. For at least 10 years, this regime “tied the hands” of state
officials, causing the economy to “expand by around 9% per year” and external debt to fall notably
in 1994, pushing international banks “into a less influential role.” 56 In terms of the eventual trade
deficit and default, there is no reason to blame BITs for an unsuitable monetary policy. Ultimately,
the way BITs were utilized, in particular with the inclusion of an unrealistic indexation of feebased systems, can be attributed to the mishandling of economically orthodox policymakers. Some
scholars in fact provided policy recommendations encouraging countries like Argentina to modify
only key provisions of first-generation BITs in order to optimize their liabilities in the investment
regime. In the end, investment policy––and BIT policy in particular––is tied to reshaping the
bargain tips so as to avoid capital runs, expensive investment arbitration, and too narrow a
regulatory space.
Importantly, the purpose here is not to determine whether or not it is convenient for
Argentina to uphold its bilateral treaties; it is only sufficient to show that incentives for BIT
denunciation do exist. Moreover, it is safe to assume that such incentives take the form of ideology
and performance at investor-state settlements given that empirical work has coined these factors
when examining BIT exit in cases outside Latin America. Thus, in the following section, I lay out
the hazards and costs that Argentina faced as a BIT holder.

ii.

Costs of BITs
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My study, like Calvert’s “Constructing Investor Rights? Why Some States (Fail to) Terminate
Bilateral Investment Treaties,” aims to identify what makes countries heavily targeted by ISDS
decide to abandon or uphold their BITs. So far, there has not been consensus as to what this
variable is. Neither of the two variables that researchers have coined to answer this question ––
ideology and exposure to investor-state settlements–– suit Argentina’s case.57 On the one hand,
ideology is too much of a sweeping variable, which only helps to predict BIT compliance during
liberal administrations. Granted, conservative ideology envisions less state intervention in the
economy, and thus naturally requires less regulatory space. This preference makes conservative
governments less vulnerable to the Obsolescing Bargain Model because their values repel public
confiscation as well as taxes to private revenues. Progressive governments see state intervention
acts more favorably, and therefore quickly seize bargain power as soon as it becomes available.
For 12 years, Argentina was ruled by protectionists and nationalists Néstor Kirchner and Cristina
Kirchner, and they were subject to OMB all throughout their mandates. Among the most investorhostile policies, they nationalized the entire foreign-owned utilities infrastructure and froze––in
some provincial authorities even reduced—the tariff system (user fees),58 all of which accounted
for treaty breaches. Therefore, should ideology be a predictor of BIT exit, Argentina should have
been expected to terminate treaties during the Kirchners’ administrations. This, however, was not
the case.
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Numerous studies show that the greater the exposure to ISDS, the more likely states are to
renegotiate or terminate investment agreements. 59 From this it follows that the more arbitral
outcomes favor investors, the more pressured policy makers are to reconsider their legal
commitments. Most of this trend in the literature focuses on policy learning and has the underlying
assumption that states grow in their understanding of treaties after repeated exposure. 60 Over time,
this learning allows them to make decisions that improve their welfare. In this case, ruling
authorities realize that their liabilities to BITs strengthen investors’ bargaining power vis á vis the
host state—which is precisely what bilateral treaties were designed for in the first place.
By 2022, Argentina accumulated 63 ISDS cases, the majority of which were settled before
a court ruling, and over 25% of which ended with an investor-favoring ruling (see Table E for a
disaggregated summary of arbitral outcomes over time). As expected, most cases were triggered
by the Financial Crisis of the 2000s, reaching 20 cases only in 2003. In the same year, Argentina
accumulated half of all the ISDS lawsuits in the world.61 Scholars estimate that had Argentina lost
all its ISDS cases, it would owe up to US$80 billion in compensations to foreign firms, which
equals ten times Argentina’s spending on education in 2012 and is 25% greater than the budget for
pension payments.62 Unfortunately, the outcome of ISDS cases from 2014 onward are pending,
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and hence we cannot draw inferences from them. However, based on our understanding of the
economic and political context of Argentina between 2016–2020, we could expect generally
positive outcomes considering the investor-friendly government of liberal Mauricio Macri.

Figure C
Argentina’s ISDS Over Time by Outcome63
[Source: Author’s calculations made on the basis of data from UNCTAD

(2022)]

There is, nonetheless, an objection to assessing Argentina’s performance based on the
number of cases filed. As one can gather from figure C, most of the outcomes favoring investors
occurred during 2001–2009. Some have argued that emergency-triggered cases (mostly the ones

gov.ar/onp/html/presupresumen/resum12.pdf. Lavopa, Barreiros, and Bruno, “How to Kill a Bit and Not Die
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outcomes by total outcomes. The overall regression was not statistically significant (𝑅2 = 0.227, p = 0.062). Thus,
we cannot say with a degree of certainty greater than 95% that there were fewer investor-favoring outcomes over time.
The degree of confidence is extremely close to such value, this being 93.8%. Thus, we could expect more correlation
in a few decades.
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brought about because of pesification and re-nationalization) cannot define Argentina’s ordinary
level of compliance as they were filed during an extraordinary time: the Argentinian financial crisis
(detailed in earlier sections).64 In fact, this is precisely what the Argentinian defense team held in
the investor-state hearings of the 2000s. My own empirical work also found this to be true: my
interviewees were convinced that Argentina’s strategies before ICSID were successful. It is
important to give this view a fair chance because the narrative about a country’s level of
performance at ISDS can affect decision-making and impact BIT adherence. Many IR scholars
that focus on the individual level of policy learning argue that key stakeholders make decisions
“by weighing their prior beliefs … against the quantity and quality of observed experience.” 65 This
view proposes that policy makers are bounded rational actors, meaning that they are prompted to
ignore statistics and follow cognitive shortcuts.66 In this case, the fact that Argentina’s legal
hardships were due to an extraordinary circumstance may be the perfect heuristic to avoid
accepting failure of the regime as a whole. For example, the arbitral lawyers that I interviewed
stressed that the Argentinian arbitral defense team had a steep learning curve and that its
performance in arbitral courts improved over time. That Argentina had more “practice” at ICSID
than any other country obviously had an impact on the country’s sense of familiarity with, and
insight into, the system.67 In the interviews, experts who participated in defending Argentina
before ICSID shared the view that Argentina’s performance, and outcomes, at ISDS were, at the
end of the day, positive:
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We reduced the claimability of Argentina between $33,000 and $43,000 billion dollars, depending
on the type of interest applied in the calculation. The result, I repeat, during my administration, was
ten cents per dollar demanded. So, this decision paid off, we could say… to stay within the system.
Eventually the time came when … we became experts. What's more, we had more expertise than
our rivals because we had more cases … We are a permanent state law firm now.68

This observation could also show support for bounded rationality theorists: the government
does not decide rationally based on the overall performance at arbitral courts but based on the
perception of those who participated. Interviewees were not only overall satisfied with their
performance at ISDS, but also with the outcomes. It is worth considering, however, that knowledge
of the system does not necessarily translate into affinity with the system. Although Argentinians
felt good about their position at ICSID, this does not mean that they endorsed investor-state
settlements or bilateral treaties. We ought to remember that officials from the Kirchners
administration were ideologically tilted towards the left. In the in-depth interviews of this study,
all former officials raised ideological as well as technical objections to the foreign investment
regime, ranging from ambiguity of treaty language to arbitrariness of criteria in ISDS rulings. See,
for example, the following comment:

The Argentine State raised a series of defenses that went beyond the bilateral treaty … if you go to article 31
of the Vienna Convention, it says: you don’t apply the treaty alone. The treaty must be applied in accordance
with the general principles of International Law. In other words, there are a lot of things that come into play
when it comes to interpreting whether a treaty has been violated. And the big problem with BITs, especially
first-generate BITs, is that they were written in the most vague and ambiguous way possible.69

It has also been recorded in interviews and speeches that (progressive) Argentinian Ministries of
Economy as well as General Attorneys were overwhelmingly critical of investor-state dispute
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settlement.70 In fact, most of them continue to endorse the actions that led to treaty breaches given
that they recognize and embrace state regulatory space. Take the following quote, for example: “I
believe that the Argentine government makes decisions on behalf of the common good, protecting
its citizens. In other words, they are reasons of public interest. Political decisions are taken, and it
is known that they can have consequences, but these consequences are bore.”71
Lastly, I would like to address the “bounded rationality” counterargument, or the view that
perceptions about Argentina’s performance at ISDS weigh more than performance itself. Although
I recognize the existence of psychological obstacles in rational decision-making, in the end, I find
it both realistic and productive to overlook this alternative due to its inability to generate
predictions. For the sake of parsimony, this paper will adhere to the Obsolescing Bargain Model
premises; mainly, I assume that host states make decisions to exploit foreign investors’ rent even
when facing institutional and legal restraints. Besides, the evidence in section 7 shows Argentina
did consider leaving the BIT system.
Argentina did not have to drown in ISDS cases for officials to reconsider their
preferences—countries that terminated their treaties had arguably fewer incentives. Not only did
Argentina have more exposure to arbitral claims than any other state, but it also lost a considerable
amount of them. By 2013, Argentina had amassed almost half a billion dollars of debt to ISDS
claimants. 72 This thesis finds that there were compelling incentives for policymakers to seek either
treaty re-design or exit. The fact that Argentina remained affixed to the BIT regime after its
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traumatic experience is a puzzle that raises new questions for the literature. Are there impediments
to exiting BITs? Does treaty termination imply overly high reputational costs?

7

Why Has Not Argentina Left?
i.

BIT Termination Is Also Costly

My empirical research finds that Argentina has shown discontent with the investment
regime. Legislative and executive officials have discussed many times the need to address the
country’s vulnerability to ISDS. This has been documented in both primary and secondary sources,
including congressional speeches, news articles, and in-depth interviews with mandataries, all of
which will be cited extensively in the present section.
Generally, countries that want to reduce their exposure to investment arbitration have three
options: BIT amendment, withdrawal from ICSID, and BIT termination. 73 Both Bolivia and
Ecuador denounced the ICSID Convention before terminating their investment agreements.74 In
Argentina, the amendment of existing BITs did not take place. Dissatisfaction with the design of
first-generation BITs was instead addressed through the re-wording of newly signed treaties and
partly through the creation of the Argentinian BIT model. “Guglielmino created the famous BIT
model,” said a former officer of the General Attorney’s arbitration team. “That was the most
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extravagant moment, when we put together a little package with how we would like the BIT model
for Argentina to be.”75 When asked about the modification of treaty language, he responded,

Of those in force, no. Of the new ones, yes. Argentina did negotiate new treaties, I myself negotiated 4 or 5
treaties with Japan, Chile, Qatar, Mexico, the United Emirates, Singapore … But obviously, based on
experience, I already knew how to incorporate more precise language, like … what is fair and equitable
treatment? What is the minimum standard?76

There were influential actors who pushed for BIT termination as well as ICSID
withdrawal—from politicians pressuring the government to not pay the arbitral awards to anti-BIT
Congress bills.77 In 2005, the Congress discussed withdrawing from the ICSID Convention.78
Horacio D. Rosatti, Guglielmino’s predecessor as Attorney General, promoted a legal
interpretation whereby all international court rulings were subject to review in Argentine courts,
as based on the Argentine Constitution. 79 Even the free-trade administration of Mauricio Macri
sought relief from BIT arbitration: all private concession contracts signed under his administration
included a clause that made foreign investors relinquish their BIT protections.80 This obviously
did not hold in ICSID courtrooms. The office of the General Attorney held “countless meetings”
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addressing the dangers of BITs, but “they were endless technical meetings” that led nowhere.81 At
high level politics, however, the decision to withdraw from BITs or the ICSID Convention were
deemed “inefficient.”82 Quoting Néstor Kirchner’s General Attorney, “Argentina made the
decision, in fact I made the decision, to stay within the system. And overall, we did pretty well.” 83
In the remaining sections of this paper, I propose a set of factors that could explain the
rationality behind Argentinian Peronists’ decision to stay within the BIT regime. The present
section lays out three factors, and the extent to which they affect the bargaining position of the
government. Though all factors presented here encourage BIT adherence, in the end I find that
Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock is the only variable that differentiates the behavior of the core
case, Argentina, from the ancillary case, Ecuador.

ii.

Hypothesis A) Reputational Consequences of BIT Termination

A factor that might deter governments to withdraw from the regime is the fear that this will
discourage FDI inflows. Beth Simmons refers to this dynamic as “audience costs,” a “generic set
of political costs a government might face if it reneges on a commitment.”84 Scholar Michael Tomz
builds a reputation-based theory to explain interactions between governments and foreign
creditors. I believe, as Tomz does, that this theory can be easily applied to attitude vis á vis foreign
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investors too. Tomz explains that foreign investors “shy away”85 from deploying assets in
countries whose governments are prone to seize their profits through taxation or expropriation.
When they decide where to invest, however, investors do not have perfect information regarding
a government’s plans to expropriate. Thus they infer the likelihood of government opportunistic
behavior based on cues from the context, or a government’s reputation. On their part, host
governments want investors to qualify their countries as safe environments, whether they plan to
behave accordingly or not. 86 In other words, they want to keep a reputation of non-expropriators.
This hypothesis thus predicts that governments would not opt for BIT termination as it is an overt
sign of, at the very least, desire to expropriate.
This dynamic was an important conversation axis in the interviews of this study, though
participants’ perception was not always aligned. Interestingly, interviewees reflect the views of
the scholarship: some understand BITs as signaling devices, while others are more skeptical about
this notion. The first group holds that governments will not pursue treaty termination because they
anticipate this will spook potential investors and discourage current investors from “purchasing
additional property in the host country.” 87 This, in return, will provoke a knock-off effect,
producing withdrawals and possibly halting investment. The second, more agnostic about BITs’
“teeth,” believe that BIT ratification or termination is independent from FDI inflows. Hence,
reputational consequences or political costs of terminating BITs could only be meaningful in
persuading uninformed public officials out of treaty exit.
There were mixed thoughts regarding the impact of termination amongst the officials I
interviewed. One of them held that Argentinian policy makers were uncertain about the impact of
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dropping treaties. He also mentioned that an irrational fear existed during his time serving: “I
believe that Argentina always had that conception, even in the Kirchner administrations … the
fear—if you want, irrational—about the impact of denouncing or modifying the treaties. That fear
was present all along.” Other former public officers deferred and were positive that BITs do not
affect FDI: “The investments do not come because you have, or terminate or do not terminate, or
sign or do not sign these pieces of paper.” 88 Though strong currents in the literature argue that
BITs positively stimulate investments, many empirical studies dispute this relationship.89
My interviewees held the following view: for them, BITs do not attract FDI. Hence, the
reputational consequences, or political costs, of terminating BITs could only be meaningful in
persuading uninformed public officials out of treaty exit. Officers from the General Attorney’s
Office of International Affairs voiced that not all government officials were cognizant of BIT
terms. In fact, the BIT experts are the arbitral lawyers who prepare Argentina’s defense before
ICSID. The problem is that this unit “is a technical body that is not involved in making major
political decisions that can impact these issues.” As one of them said, “We are at the trenches …
and our voice often gets lost halfway when warning the big decision makers to be careful” with
legal commitments.
Another takeaway regarding reputation in the investment regime is that this depended on
time and position. A former official explained that, in the early 2000s, Argentina was the country
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with most lawsuits at ICSID, and this was at a time when there was still little information about
the practice. He later told me that Argentina leaving the regime by exiting BITs would have sent
a terrible signal, not only to investors, but also peer governments and institutions:

We were always the ugly duckling of ICSID, and now we're leaving?!! You have 40 cases and, aside from
that, you're leaving? […] If Argentina starts speaking against BITs and ISDS, if it starts complaining about
the ambiguity of the standard of fair treatment ... it would have had little value […] We were not in a position
where we could lecture anyone about anything. We had to take responsibility, lower our heads, and defend
ourselves. Argentina did not know where the heck it was standing. It had no political weight. Any decision
by Argentina saying “well, I am going to modify a treaty because in reality from now on...” Dude, you have
20 cases, 50 cases, 40 cases, every day a new one.90

This consideration follows Tomz’ theory as well as Simmons’ argument that a government’s desire
to hold an investor-friendly reputation fluctuates over time. For example, during times of crisis
and economic hardship, Simmons says, governments are more likely to rely on formal instruments
to attract investment, like BITs. Therefore, Argentina was already on the brink of the investment
regime because of these fiasco policies in 1990–2003. Even when the crisis was brought to an end,
the Kirchner government continued to violate treaties when re-nationalizing the public services.
Papers may not mean much, but they make a difference when it is all you have. The following two
examples support Simmons’ argument that BITs are signed during stressful times:
Q1: “Argentina wants to continue playing by the rules. That is why Argentina faced these lawsuits. Let's see,
how to tell you? If we left the system, it would have meant we were kicking the board. The first image
Argentina wanted to convey is that it was acting responsible with the lawsuits against it, that Argentina was
facing them in an international court. Now, the second image it wanted to convey is that it wanted to stay
within the system. because denouncing these treaties at a time when Argentina was the country with the
largest number of claims before the ICSID, was a political message. Having Argentina throwing everything
away was even contradictory to the guarantees it had assumed when taking on the demands he was receiving.”
91
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illusion… Because this is another issue, it’s the illusion that signing these treaties will per se activate the
FDI.” 92

Importantly, these quotes refer to different “stressful situations.” Q1 details the decision-making
(to not drop BITs) during protectionist Kirchner’s rule, in 2003. Q2 refers to attitudes regarding
BITs during the more liberal administration of Mauricio Macri (2016–2020). This officer had an
interesting experience negotiating BITs since he lived and served during both left-center and rightcenter administrations. The contrast between the two also provides detailed insight into the
variable this study controls, which is ideology.

To conclude, I have fair motives to believe that this experience is common among BIT
holders. Namely, the threat of reputational harm affects not only our ancillary case of Ecuador, but
all countries in general. I also encountered no relevant proof that reputation affects Argentina in
an extraordinary way. Because this ‘treatment’ is shared among the relevant groups of this study
(those who withdraw from their treaties and those who do not), it can be arguably discarded as the
independent variable.

iii.

Hypothesis B) Time Inconsistencies

As detailed in the background section, BITs are designed to provide protections to investors
in the long term. In particular, BITs have survival clauses that protect investors’ rights well beyond
their denunciation date. All of Argentina’s BITs state that if any of the parties decide to terminate
the treaty, the BIT will continue to be effective for a period of either 10 or 15 years after the date
of termination.93 (See Appendix for the exact duration of Argentina’s sunset clauses). Hence, if
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an official decides to terminate a BIT, he will absorb all the costs without the benefits: he will
continue to be bound by the law of BITs for the rest of his mandate (even if he gets re-elected,
depending on term duration) and will receive immediate backlash. In fact, this was the exact reason
why Guglielmino did not withdraw Argentina from its BITs when he had the chance:

I do not recommend any country in Latin America to denounce BITs, and why? because of… abrupt political
changes that occur in cycles shorter than 15 years. … how can one know if in 15 years we will still have
center-left governments in office? What if… after denouncing the BITs, right before the [survival period] of
our treaties expires, they are ratified again. It would then be an act of inefficient hostility, so to speak … It
would mean that we are litigating for animosity. And there is obviously no way to guarantee that this decision
will be maintained over the years. There is no way.94

Now, in the language of time horizons, a phenomenon that the literature on international treaties
deals with extensively, 95 Gulielmino is making two points. First, he provides a classic time
inconsistency argument: denouncing the BITs is too costly of a measure for any democratically
elected office holder. This could also be an instance of Kydland and Prescott’s “time inconsistency
with optimal policy.” Any government that decides to take on this policy will reap no benefits,
only costs (in his words, it would be “litigating for animosity”). The second point he makes is more
sophisticated, and I would say largely neglected in the literature. The interviewee articulates that
there is no guarantee that this “inefficient hostility,” BIT denunciation, will keep Argentina’s out
of the system and safe from international investment arbitration. In the period that follows BIT
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denunciation, political overturn could erase the sought benefits by returning to the system.
Formally, this quote embodies two different arguments that take us in the same direction.
Time inconsistencies could explain why Rafael Correa withdrew Ecuador from BITs in the
second year of his mandate. Ecuador’s presidential terms have a duration of 5 years with unlimited
opportunities for reelection. 96 In fact, leftist Rafael Correa was the one who removed presidential
term limits in the first place (with the promise he would not run immediately after his second term).
His political party, however, won in 2017, potentially giving Correa a time horizon of 15 years.
Thus, one could argue that governments with longer time horizons (including non-democratic
regimes) are more likely to terminate BITs than those with shorter time horizons.
An interesting development that occurred in 2021 is that Ecuador, 12 years after its
resignation of ICSID and 4 years after the termination of its BITs, rejoined the ICSID, potentially
giving support for Guglielmino’s sharp argument regarding sunset clauses and BIT denunciation.
This happened in the context of liberalization policies by Correa’s presidential successor Lenin
Moreno. With the 2021 election of Guillermo Lasso, I expect to see an expansion of this
economically liberal project for Ecuador, and possible comeback to BIT ratification.
Sunset clauses are thus an important discouragement from abandoning the BIT regime. As
explained by former General Attorney and illustrated by Ecuador’s case, even if exiting BITs is
the right policy for Argentina to take, and even if policy-makers are aware of it, robust ideological
turnovers shorten time horizons. The question that remains is, why have sunset clauses not
dissuaded other governments from leaving the investment regime, including Ecuador’s Correa
himself? Did he not see it coming? Can my research question be explained by a rather

96

Limits on presidential terms were brought back by Lenin Moreno in 2018. Maggy Ayala and Marcelo
Rochabrún, “Ecuador Votes to Bring Back Presidential Term Limits,” The New York Times (The New York Times,
February 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/world/americas/ecuador-presidential-term-limits.html.

43

constructivist stream of explanations, such as bounded rationality? 97 Can this explain the BIT exit
policy of Bolivia, South Africa, Indonesia and India as well? The problem with this argument is
that Argentina is not the only country that has sunset clauses. The only thing we would need in
order to discard this argument is to find a center-left undemocratic country, with theoretically
longer time horizons, that has not abandoned BITs. I could briefly mention Vietnam, for example,
which has only terminated five of its 67 BITs, or Venezuela, which has terminated only two of its
thirty BITs.98 Therefore, though decisively important for the immune system of all BITs, time
horizons cannot serve as an independent variable in our case study, seeing that it is also present in
countries that have not abandoned BITs.

While the incentives for staying or withdrawing from the BIT regime can vary in nature,
not all of them can be held accountable for the observed difference in our cases. While I could
potentially attribute Argentina’s treaty adherence to being the result of either reputational
consequences on FDI or time inconsistencies, these cannot explain why Ecuador behaved
differently. Ecuador’s treaties also have sunset clauses that generate time inconsistencies and there
is no reason to believe that Ecuador is inattentive to reputational consequences of treaty exit. In
strict terms, both factors described above can be thought of as treatments. And we cannot attribute
them to the dependent variable if both our experimental case and our control case have “received”
them. We ought to be careful, however, not to dismiss these variables as meaningless, given that
evidence shown earlier strongly suggests that Argentinian officeholders were indeed mindful of
them when making the decision to uphold its old treaties. What I show in the upcoming section is
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that there is an additional treatment that Argentina has which Ecuador does not. This is crosssector diversification of FDI. I will show that Hypothesis C) Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock
explains why these countries decided to take different directions regarding their BITs. While
Hypotheses A and B may weigh heavily in the decision-making of Argentina to stay within the
system, they only do so if Argentina has a diversified FDI stock.

iv.

Hypothesis C): Sectoral Composition of FDI Stock
“There are countries that can [exit BITs] because they have a specific weight that
allows them to do it.”99

The underlying condition that makes reputational consequences on FDI or time
inconsistencies weigh more heavily for Argentina than for Ecuador is a diversified FDI portfolio–
–an aspect of BITs immune system that is largely overlooked by the literature. This section argues
that sectoral composition of FDI increases the costs of terminating BITs for Argentina and
minimizes the costs of terminating BITs for Ecuador. This is because when host countries decide
to exit BITs, they weigh the benefits of potential investments against the benefits of the
appropriation of capital itself. 100 The degree of diversification of FDI portfolio reveals a) important
differences between Argentina’s and Ecuador’s most FDI-target sector and their most
internationally litigated sector, and b) Argentina’s and Ecuador’s capacity to absorb sunk costs
from foreign investments. The logic and evidence for this argument are shown in the current
section. Mainly, countries whose foreign investments are concentrated in mineral extraction
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industries, such as Ecuador, can absorb higher sunk costs and therefore are more likely to abandon
investment treaties.

Diversified FDI vs. Oil-Based FDI

First, I must show the difference in investment portfolios in our core case and shadow case
(see figure D below). While Argentina shows a diversified portfolio led by manufacturing,
financial institutions, and extractives, Ecuador shows an overwhelming concentration of FDI in
the oil industry. In a report in 2016, the Central Bank of Ecuador declared that from 1990–1999
the average share of the oil industry from total FDI was roughly 80%.101 In 2015, nine years after
the major nationalization of the oil industry, Ecuador reported an oil share of 61% of total FDI.
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Figure D
Argentina and Ecuador: Sectoral Distribution of FDI and ISDS Cases
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[Source: Author’s calculations made on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Argentina, the Central Bank of
Ecuador, and UNCTAD (2022)]102

Figure D also shows ISDS cases filed against each country by sector, providing an
important comparison regarding industries prone to generate clashes with investors. ISDS lawsuits
in both our core case and shadow case are concentrated largely in one sector of their economy. In
the case of Argentina, over 50% belong to the provision of public services and, in the case of
Ecuador, approximately 50% belong to mining and quarrying––in particular, petroleum.
This means that both economies have an especially sensitive economic sector which is
more likely than others to draw disagreements with investors. There are political and technological
reasons for this phenomenon, all studied by the literature on OBM and expropriation patterns. 103
Some argue that foreign ownership of certain industrial activities can be particularly problematic
when combined with beliefs about economic nationalism and sovereignty. 104 OBM theorists find
this to be the case for industries like national defense, utilities, rails, and communications. In the
case of mineral resources, Kobrin and others argue that when the extractive industry has an
overwhelming share of the economy, “even a minimal degree of … foreign ownership” in this
sector is deemed “intolerable.” 105 There are many reasons that explain how public services
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(Argentina’s main target sector in ISDS) are subject to OBM. Scholar Alison Post articulated that
“utilities and infrastructure services, including highways, urban water and sanitation systems, and
fixed line telephony” are special because their final product “is consumed by masses of individual
citizens.” In countries where these enterprises have been run by the state for long enough, the
public, ignorant of private ownership, blame the government for raise in prices and user fees. This,
consequently, puts pressure on office-holders to either cap prices or refuse to raise them.106
There is, however, a distinction between Argentina’s most “sensitive” sector and
Ecuador’s. While Ecuador’s sectoral distribution of ISDS cases roughly coincides with that of their
FDI stock, the same cannot be said about Argentina. In fact, Argentina’s problematic lawsuits are
concentrated in an economic sector that only represents 7% of their annual FDI inflow: public
services. It is thus worth asking at this point why would Argentina want to abandon a regime that
only litigates 7% of its annual foreign investments? It would simply be too costly to dismantle the
foreign investment regime only to avoid lawsuits that target such a small part of the economy. This
suggests that Argentina’s decision to remain within the BIT system may respond to cross-sector
diversification in their foreign investment stock. Ecuador faces a different scenario, and thus
naturally holds different preferences regarding its international commitments. Because foreign
investments overwhelmingly target the oil industry, Ecuadorian office-holders care less about
future FDI inflows. It makes sense that Argentina is willing to suffer international litigation if most
of it targets public services, which encompass only 7% of their annual FDI. As illustrated by earlier
quotes from the interviews, Argentina has more incentives to participate in the investment regime
since it is more able to enjoy its benefits.

106

Post, Foreign and Domestic Investment in Argentina, 15.

49

Additionally, Argentina can enjoy the benefits of BITs protections seeing that it is a
moderate capital exporter. Ecuador is not, as depicted in the graph below. In fact, Argentinian
investors were able to invoke BITs to file claims against Peru, Mexico, and Spain for treaty breach.
Among five ISDS cases in which Argentina was the home of the claimants, Argentinians won two
times and lost once.107 This means that if Argentina were to leave its investment treaties, it would
also be leaving its foreign investments abroad unprotected.

Figure E
Argentina and Ecuador’s FDI Net Outflows (% of GDP) Over Time
[Source: Author’s calculations made on the basis of International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments database,
supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources
(2022)].

The remaining two cases have pending awards. “Ecuador | Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator |
UNCTAD” accessed March 29, 2022, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-disputesettlement/country/61/ecuador/respondent.
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So far, I have established that Argentina has more to gain from future FDI than from treaty
termination due to differences between its most FDI-targeted sector and its most internationally
litigated sector. The following section will show that not only Argentina has more luck attracting
diversified foreign capital, but also that it is harder for it to capture the sunk costs of its current
foreign-owned capital.

Sunk Costs Variation Across Sectors

Why does the magnitude of sunk costs vary across sectors? And why is this important to
the question regarding investment treaties? Though there are many explanations for this
phenomenon, I will focus on the technological ones.
According to our OBM theorists, after initial investment occurs, “capital is sunk,” meaning
that it cannot be recovered or transferred. 108 Scholars identify technological differences that affect
the magnitude of sunk costs across sectors, thus making absorption of sunk costs (e.g., by
expropriation) more desirable than long-term commitment to property rights. My work contributes
to this body of literature––that mostly studies expropriation––by extending the scope of the theory.
Fluctuations of size in sunk costs can also explain legal preferences in the investment regime. I
propose that the size of sunk costs not only determines a government’s likelihood to nationalize a
particular sector, but also causes it to shift its preferences regarding treaty adherence and exposure
to international arbitration.
Frederick Truitt is one of the first to show how expropriation varies across sectors due to
the size of sunk costs. There is also an array of studies that quantify patterns of expropriation by
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industry over time.109 This body of literature demonstrates that countries are more likely to
expropriate FDI in extractive industries––particularly in oil. All researchers emphasize the role of
fixed capital, or immobile capital, to explain variation of sunk costs across sectors. As explained
by Eaton and Gersovitz, any investment consists of both mobile and immobile assets. Management
is intangible and internationally mobile (it includes firm-specific knowledge, organizational
experience, networks, and access to international markets, among others). Tangible capital, on the
other hand, is not mobile and immediately becomes sunk costs after expropriation. Studies have
demonstrated that activities that rely heavily on managerial services are rarely expropriated, even
when nationalization becomes a general policy. 110
It is also important to add that the mineral extraction industry requires the deposit of high
sunk costs at the beginning of the investment (for exploration and excavation infrastructure, e.g.),
and all this before expecting profits—and without guarantees. Furthermore, oil extraction
technology is relatively easy to handle and requires little firm-specific knowledge. Hence, should
an expropriation occur, management can be substituted locally. This makes resource-extractive
sectors particularly vulnerable to the Obsolescing Bargain theory. Prior to initial investments,
foreign companies have all the bargaining power because states are in desperate need of FDI and
thus promise overly generous scenarios to prospective investors. Once the initial investment is

109
See, for example Christopher Hajzler, “Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments: Sectoral Patterns
from 1993 to 2006,” Review of World Economics 148, no. 1 (August 2011): 119–149,
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Organization 34, no. 2 (1980): pp. 177-206, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300018737; Kennedy, Jr., C. R.
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made, all the bargain power shifts towards the state, and foreign investments become hostage
assets vulnerable to nationalization. In other industries such as manufacturing or finance, the value
of tangible capital (plant, equipment, inventory, land, etc.) is relatively low in comparison to the
extractive sector. Plus, these generally require more technical and management knowledge, which
makes expropriation of these firms neither profitable nor desirable. Argentina’s annual FDI is
mostly concentrated, as observed in Figure D, in manufacturing and financial institutions (which
together account for 61%). Mining and quarrying only account for 13% of the total. Ecuador’s FDI
inflow is not only lower than Argentina’s (when controlling GDP), but it also specializes in oil. 111
Ecuador has thus much more to gain from direct absorption of fixed capital from oil industries
(through direct and indirect expropriation) than from attraction of potential investments.
One of the most relevant studies for this argument not only shows that expropriation acts
happen more often in the sphere of petroleum, but also that they are more valuable. 112 In a sample
of 65 countries, Hajzler shows that 40% of the expropriation “acts” between 1960–2006 targeted
extractive industries. In Table B, we see that petroleum accounts for 14.3% of the acts in the
sample, absorbing a total value of 41.6% of the shares. The same proportion of expropriation acts,
but this time on manufacturing, comprised only 9.4% of the shares, almost 25% of the value for
expropriations in petroleum. In utilities, the same proportion of acts made up for 13.4% of the
shares––more than in manufacturing but still significantly less than in petroleum.

“Investment Policy Review - Ecuador,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Investment Policy Reviews., 11.
112
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Table B
Sectoral Distribution of Expropriation Acts and Value in 1990–2006 (percent shares)

[Source: Christopher Hajzler, “Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments: Sectoral Patterns”]

Did Ecuador Take the Oil Money and Run?113
The literature on both international law and political economy emphasizes that the OBM
is usually set into motion during times of unstable or inferior economic performance. Kobrin, in
particular, adds that this sometimes coincides with periods when mineral prices rise, increasing
even more state temptations to seize foreign profits. 114 There is also a consensus that if a particular

The Economist, “Grabbing Occidental; Ecuador,” Economist Intelligence Unit N.A. Incorporated (Vol.
379, Issue 8478), May 20, 2006, https://go-galecom.proxy.library.upenn.edu/ps/i.do?p=STND&u=upenn_main&id=GALE%7CA145932341&v=2.1&it=r&sid=su
mmon.
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industry dominates the economy, it will be hard for the state to tolerate foreign ownership. 115 In
earlier sections, I showed how leftist Néstor Kirchner re-nationalized public services in Argentina
in 2003. In the case of Ecuador, the most important expropriation period occurred in 2006–2007,
when President Rafael Correa seized Occidental Petroleum, the largest oil company in the country.
This political process had started earlier. In the early 2000s, Ecuador started a process of reevaluation of the concession contracts signed with foreign firms in the extractive sector. 116 Julia
Calvert explains that, in 2001, Ecuador’s told oil companies they would no longer receive
reimbursements on value added tax (VAT). The VAT refund was an old investor-friendly policy
that consisted of reimbursing foreign oil companies for expenditures related to “the production of
oil for export.”117 The obsolescing bargain process started to weigh heavily for Ecuadorian
officials wanting to use oil profits to fund welfarist projects. Not long thereafter, authorities
reported that having issued VAT policy was an error and not only refused to continue issuing these
refunds but required oil firms to return formerly granted VAT payments. Several firms withheld
their VAT credits, including Canadian Encana and American Occidental Petroleum, both of which
reacted by filing ISDS claims. In arbitral courts, they held changes in the VAT policies violated
several treaty provisions, including expropriation, discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, and
full protection and security. The General Attorney’s defense argued that state taxation policies
must be brought to national courts.
Then there is the issue of mineral price volatility, which further pushed Ecuadorians to
want to seize oil profits. By 2005, when “oil prices were tripled and continued to rise,” not only
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state officials but the civil society pressured state authorities, claiming the rise in Ecuadorian oil
should improve the collective welfare of nationals, calling it “inalienable state heritage”.118 The
government thus ordered the auditing of petroleum companies, which established that companies
were collecting “extraordinary profits.” The process of Contract Renegotiations that occurred in
Argentina was replicated in Ecuador, almost simultaneously and through several instances of
reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. In 2005, the Congress announced the so-called windfall 50%
tax on oil revenues when these surpassed a certain amount. Two years after, with the election of
leftist Rafael Correa, this tax rose to 99%. In October 2007, Correa’s administration gave foreign
oil firms an ultimatum. They had three choices; to comply with the windfall tax of 99%, renegotiate its initial contract into a service contract, or to divest. 119 Occidental Petroleum filed an
ISDS claim demanding over US$1 billion in compensation. The process of oil nationalization was
long and robust, including a total of 18 reforms of the Hydrocarbons Law, such as article 14. 120

The fossil fuel industry is declared a public utility in all its phases, including the set of operations to
extract, refine, transport and commercialize it. Therefore, the state proceeds with the expropriation of
land, buildings, installations and other assets […] which are necessary for the development of this
industry.121
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In 2012, President Correa also established the Citizen’s Audit Commission, which ought
to examine the impact of BITs in the country, and asserted that the life of such treaties depended
on the decision of the Commission. The Commission was led by eight national and foreign
investment arbitration experts, including arbitration expert Osvaldo Guglielmino, whom I have
interviewed and quoted extensively throughout this study. 122 The 664 pages resolution
recommended the denunciation of Ecuador’s BITs. Among its main points, the document 1)
provided evidence that Ecuador’s FDI inflows were independent from treaty protections, 2)
analyzed the costs of BITs, showing that “legal expenditures surpassed 94 million US$ in arbitral
award payments,”123 and 3) argued that Occidental Petroleum illegally sold shares to a different
firm without the authorization of the government. The latter had constituted a violation of the
private concession contracts signed between the parties. This is the reason why it was “unilaterally
terminated by the state of Ecuador.” The Commission also articulated that the riddance of BITs
took place in the context of a “dismantlement of neoliberal policies enacted before 2007.” It also
emphasized that Ecuador had a new model of development, embodied in the 2008 Constitution,
whereby it states that FDI must be subjected to national objectives of improving the collective
welfare.124 In 2016, Correa reported having terminated Ecuador’s bilateral treaties.
In this section, I have shown that the country’s sectoral composition of FDI not only
predicts where expropriation may occur, but also where international treaties may be rescinded.
This section has examined two important reasons for such phenomenon: varying sunk costs across
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sectors and differences between FDI target sector and ISDS target sector. I have also shown that
public services comprise roughly half of Argentina’s total ISDS claims, while encompassing only
7% of its annual FDI. Naturally, the high costs of BIT termination are not worth evading litigations
that affect such a small share of the economy, however numerous these litigations may be.
The same, however, cannot be said about Ecuador. The size of oil sunk costs make Ecuador
more capable and willing to seize foreign profits than Argentina. As epitomized by one of the
interview participants, “And that's something that I learned … you can't close yourself off. You
cannot. Okay? Actually, it's not that you cannot … Countries cannot denounce treaties just like
that. There are countries that can do it because they have a specific weight that allows them to do
it.”125 The “weight” that the arbitration expert is referring to is the obsolescing bargain. Argentina
is, therefore, forced to find more subtle ways to seize foreign profits. In the end, the obsolescing
bargain reveals a permanent contest between a state’s simultaneous desires to increase foreign
investment in the country and to absorb it.

8

Conclusion
BITs bite, warned economist Mary Hallward-Driemeier in 2003. Argentina, my core case,

is a paramount story that illustrates the hazards of investment treaties. If Argentina, “the ugly
duckling of ICSID” did not denounce its investment treaties, we ought to learn why. This should
give insight into overlooked aspects of BITs’ immune system. While the literature finds that
ideology can explain BIT adherence or termination, I consider ideology an important but
insufficient factor for countries to exit BITs. Linking progressive office holders to expropriation
and liberal office holders with higher levels of BIT compliance cannot explain the decision to exit

Extract from an interview with investment arbitration lawyers from Argentina’s Defense Team, 8-10
February 2022.
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investment treaties. The Kirchners in Argentina and Correa in Ecuador were both protectionists
and anti-globalization administrations which took radically different stances regarding their BITs.
The closest the literature has gone in terms of predictions for BIT adherence or defection is
exposure to international arbitration. This is also an overly broad measure that leaves our case,
Argentina, in uncertainty. In the design of this experiment, I chose to control for ideology, by
studying countries that have had progressive administrations for over a decade.
There are two other popular aspects the scholarship has identified as motives for BIT
adherence. These are time inconsistencies –embodied by sunset clauses that extend the treaty’s life
for at least a decade after (and if) it has been denounced—and the threat that treaty termination
will hurt a country’s reputation and dwindle its FDI. Ultimately, I provide a sector-based
explanation for the cases at stake. Namely, I show that while Argentina has a diversified FDI stock,
Ecuador has an overwhelming concentration of FDI in the oil industry. This increases the costs of
terminating BITs for Argentina and minimizes the costs of terminating BITs for Ecuador.
Additionally, I argue that countries whose foreign investments are concentrated in mineral
extraction industries can absorb higher sunk costs and therefore are more likely to abandon
investment treaties. Not only has Argentina had more luck attracting diversified foreign capital,
but it is also harder for it to appropriate the sunk costs of its current foreign-owned capital.
In terms of generalizability, I expect my findings to be applicable to other progressive
governments of the Global South who participate in the investment regime. Additionally, though
some works regarding BITs describe the domestic protections for FDI as “informal support” or
even “substitute” for BIT provisions, this study takes a different analytical approach. Domestic
rules should not be understood as “substitutes’ for BITs, given that they are not absent when BITs
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are in force. In other words, the law of the BITs is partly captured by existing rights in the domestic
sphere.
My research moves away from the dimension of legalization 126 to make inferences about
treaty behavior and builds a theory from a close-by field. The gist of this paper is thus a political
economy-based explanation to predict phenomena in international law. The logic and empirical
backing for this theory has already been articulated by the literature on sunk costs and
expropriation patterns.127 I quote their experimental data to draw my own conclusions about the
legal preferences of Global South countries in the context of foreign investment. My work
contributes to this body of literature––that mostly studies expropriation–– by extending the scope
of their predictions. Fluctuations of size in sunk costs can also determine legal preferences in the
investment regime. I propose that higher sunk costs not only make a government more likely to
nationalize a particular sector, but also shift its preferences regarding treaty adherence and
exposure to international arbitration.
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Appendix
Table C
Argentinian Presidents and Ideology Over Time

President

Period(s)

Ideology

Menem, Carlos

1989-1995, 1995-1999

Conservative

de la Rúa, Fernando

1999-2001

Conservative

Rodíguez Saá, Adolfo (a)

23/12/2001 - 30/12/2001

N/A

Duhalde, Eduardo (a)

2002-2003

N/A

Kirchner, Néstor

2003-2007

Progressive

Fernández de Kirchner, Cristina

2007-2011, 2011-2015

Progressive

Macri, Mauricio

2015-2019

Conservative

Fernández, Alberto

2019-2023

Progressive

(a) These were interim presidents that took office after de la Rúa renounced during the financial crisis of the
2000s. Due to the shortness of their presidential terms, the nature of their ideology is unclear.

Table D
Sunset Clauses Duration in Argentina’s BIT
Signed with
Algeria
Armenia
Australia
Austria
BelgiumLuxembourg
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Costa Rica
Croatia

Date of
Signature
04 October
2000
16 April 1993

Entry into
Force
28 January
2002
20 December
1994
11 January
1997
01 January
1995
20 May 1994

Sunset clause*
duration (in years)
10

17 March
1994
21 September
1993
05 November
1991
02 August
1991
05 November
1992
21 May 1997

01 May 1995

15

11 March
1997
29 April 1993

10

01 January
1995
01 August
1994
01 May 2001

15

02 December
1994

01 June 1996

10

23 August
1995
07 August
1992
28 June 1990

10
15
10
10

15

10
10

69

Czech Republic

Egypt

21 September
1996
06 November
1992
16 March
2001
18 February
1994
11 May 1992

El Salvador

09 May 1996

Finland
France

05 November
1993
03 July 1991

Germany

09 April 1991

Greece

26 October
1999
21 April 1998

Denmark
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

Guatemala
Hungary

Israel

05 February
1993
20 August
1999
07 November
1995
23 June 1995

Italy

22 May 1990

Jamaica

08 February
1994
17 May 1994

India
Indonesia

Korea
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru

14 March
1996
06 Setember
1994
13 November
1996
13 June 1996
02 October
1992
27 August
1999
10 August
1998
10 May 1996
10 November
1994

23 July 1998

10

02 January
1995
n.a.

10

01 December
1995
03 December
1993
08 January
1999
03 May 1996

15

03 March
1993
08 November
1993
07 January
2003.
07 December
2002
01 October
1997
12 August
2002
n.a.

15

10 April 1997

10

14 October
1993
01 December
1995
24 Setember
1996
01 Setember
1998
20 March
1996
22 July 1998

5

19 February
2000
01 October
1994
n.a.

10

01 February
2001
22 June 1998

15

24 October
1996

15

15

10
10
15

15
10
10
15
15
10

10
10
10
10
10

15
15

10
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Philippines
Poland
Portugal

20 September
1999
31 July 1991

Romania

06 October
1994
29 July 1993

Russia

25 June 1998

Senegal

06 April 1993

South Africa

23 July 1998

Spain

03 October
1991
22 November
1991
12 April 1991

Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Tunisia

18 February
2000
17 June 1992

Turkey

08 May 1992

Ukraine

09 August
1995
11 December
1990
14 November
1991
16 November
1993
03 June 1996

United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
Vietnam

01 January
2002
01 September
1992
03 May 1996

10

01 May 1995

10

20 November
2000
n.a.

10

01 January
2001
28 September
1992
28 September
1992
06 November
1992
07 March
2002
23 January
1995
01 May 1995

15

06 May 1997

10

19 February
1993
20 October
1994
01 July 1995

10

01 June 1997

10

10
15

10

10
15
10
10
10
10

10
10

[Source: Author’s elaboration made on the basis of all quoted BITs]

Table E
All ISDS Awards Paid by Argentina128

BIT

Case

FranceArg

SAUR
International v
Arg
Total SA v
Arg

FranceArg

128

Filed Court
in
2004 ICSID

Case No:

2004

ARB/04/1

ICSID

ARB/04/4

Decision on
liability
N/A

27
December
2010

Award Date
22 May 2014

Amount
Paid
39.90 mln
USD
269.90 mln
USD

(Publicly known of)
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FranceArg,
BLEUArg

FranceArg,
SpainArg

USAArg

USAArg

UKArg

UKArg

USAArg

USAArg
USAArg

EDF
International
SA, SAUR
International
SA and León
Participaciones
Argentinas SA
v ARG
Suez, Sociedad
General de
Aguas de
Barcelona, SA
and Vivendi
Universal, SA
(formerly
Aguas
Argentinas,
SA, Suez,
Sociedad
General de
Aguas de
Barcelona, SA
and Vivendi
Universal, SA)
v ARG (II)
El Paso
Energy
International
Company v
ARG
Continental
Casualty
Company v
ARG
National Grid
Plc v The
Argentine
Republic
BG Group Plc
v The
Republic of
Argentina
LG&E Energy
Corp, LG&E
Capital Corp.
and LG&E
International
Inc v ARG
Azurix Corp v
The Argentine
Republic (I)
CMS Gas
Transmission

2003

ICSID

ARB/03/23

N/A

11 June 2012

136.00 mln
USD

2003

ICSID

ARB/03/19

30 July
2010

2003

ICSID

ARB/03/15

N/A

31 October
2011

43.00 mln
USD

2003

ICSID

ARB/03/9

N/A

5 September
2008

2.80 mln USD

2003

UNCITRAL

n/a

N/A

3 November
2008

53.50 mln
USD

UNCITRAL

n/a

N/A

24 December
2007

185.20 mln
USD

2002

ICSID

ARB/02/1

N/A

25 July 2007

57.40 mln
USD

2001

ICSID

ARB/01/12

N/A

14 July 2006

165.20 mln
USD

2001

ICSID

ARB/01/8

N/A

12 May 2005

133.20 mln
USD

383.60 mln
USD
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FranceArg

UKARG

Company v
The Argentine
Republic
Compañía de
Aguas del
Aconquija SA
and Vivendi
Universal SA
(formerly
Compañía de
Aguas del
Aconquija, SA
and
Compagnie
Générale des
Eaux) v ARG
(I)
Suez, Sociedad
General de
Aguas de
Barcelona, SA
and Interagua
Servicios
Integrales de
Agua, SA v
ARG
AWG Group
Ltd v The
Argentine
Republic

1997

ICSID

ARB/97/3

N/A

21 November
2000

105.00 mln
USD

2003

ICSID

ARB/03/17

30 July
2010

N/A

225.70 mln
USD

2003

UNCITRAL

n/a

30 July
2010

N/A

21.00 mln
USD

[Source: Author’s elaboration made on the basis of data from UNCTAD (2022)]
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